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Abstract
Purpose -  The purpoi5e of this paper is to clarify how IT managers’ decision styles affect their 
evaluation of information technology.
Design/methodology/approach Four different decision styles were assessed in a leadership test 
directed towards IT managers. Each style included two dimensions: confidence judgment ability and 
decision heuristic usage. Participants belonging to each style were interviewed and their answers 
analysed with regard to their reasoning about central areas of IT management.
Findings Results suggest that a decision style combining intuitive and analytical capabilities lead 
to better evaluations of information technology.
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Introduction
There is at present a need for research that addresses the issue of how IT managers’ 
decision style impact on their evaluation of information technology in everyday 
business life. Studies addressing this issue are scarce, and the understanding of IT 
management would benefit from insights provided by research in judgment and 
decision making.
Decision styles may be regarded as qualitatively different, generalizablc abilities 
that cut across task content (Hodgkinson et a l, 2008), and can be considered a personal 
trait in this respect. Executives have a default style of decision making developed in 
their careers, and that style is reinforced through repealed successes or changed after 
several failures (Williams and Miller, 2002). Decision styles control the ways or modes 
in which individuals perform particular tasks. They hereby differ from cognitive 
strategies, which are optimal procedures used to perform specific tasks (Beckman, 
2002).
Intuitive decision styles may be more effective than rational styles to decision 
making in ill-structured managerial tasks, whereas an analytical decision style may be
The authors would like to thank Ole Boe and Ingrid Lindstrom for assisting with the data 
collection and for helping with the coding of the protocols.
more appropriate for well-defined managerial tasks (Dane and Pratt, 2007; McMackin 
and Slovic, 2000). Here we suggest that a manager’s performance on classical heuristic 
tasks as well as on confidence judgment tasks together constitute a manager’s decision 
style. Research on the implementation of information technology shows how managers 
often underestimate the complexity of such projects (Martins and Kambil, 1999). Partly 
as a result, many projects fail and end up becoming more costly and time-consuming 
than initially anticipated (Gottschalk, 1999),
Decision styles influence managerial governance of IT, which in turn influences the 
returns on IT-investments. Yet, few managers can explain how IT is governed (Weill 
and Ross, 2004). Hence, it is vital for managers to clarify:
• what decisions must be made in order to ensure appropriate management and 
use of IT;
• who should make these decisions; and
• how these decisions will be made and monitored.
The present study investigates to what extent IT-managers’ decision making styles 
(intuitive or analytical) influences the managers’ judgment of which decisions are 
regarded as central, who should make them, and how.
(kn em l outline o f  the article
The article is organized as follows: we start by introducing the two central concepts 
followed by the hypotheses. Subsequently we introduce the design, give a brief account 
of the participants, present the procedure/material and highlight other methodological 
issues of importance. In the next section, the results are presented, and finally 
theoretical and managerial implications of our findings are highlighted.
Confidence judgments
Managers’ ability for making realistic confidence judgments constitutes one of two 
major factors distinguishing intuitive from analytical decision processes. Levitt and 
March (1988) suggest that certain properties of interpreting an experience stem from 
features of individual inference and ju d ^ en t. People in general are not perfect 
statisticians and make systematic errors in recording the events of history and in 
making inferences from them.
Managers’ ability to make correct confidence judgments of their own knowledge 
influences both their potential to make correct forecasts (Astebro and Koehler, 2007; 
Barber and Odean, 2000; Carhart, 1997) as well as their real-world decisions (Hayward 
et a i, 2006; Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003). For instance, it has been shovm that 
calibration accuracy of managers’ judgmental processes is able to fairly well predict 
the commercial success of their new ideas (Astebro and Koehler, 2007). Overconfident 
managers are also more likely than well calibrated ones to allocate resources in their 
ventures (Hayward et al., 2006). More specifically, managers’ propensity for 
overconfidence can be linked to their decisions to allocate, use, and attain resources. 
Overconfident managers tend to deprive their ventures of resources and 
resourcefulness and thereby increase the likelihood that their ventures fail.
Optimistic overconfidence constitutes a focal bias towards the desirable outcome 
and is often prevalent in business settings (Kahneman and Ix3vallo, 1993; Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1995). In addition, financial forecasts on the whole tend to be consistently
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MD optimistic (Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981). Financial analysts on average predicted
4 g 9  that one of the most important stock exchange indices in the US would grow by 21.9
’ per cent per year from 1982 to 1997, whereas the actual growth averaged 7.6 per cent
(Cadsby, 2000). Similarly, a survey of maaoeconomic predictions from 14 OECD 
countries found that industrial firms’ production estimates were systematically 
over-optimistic in their production estimates (Madsen, 1994).
1328 Executives in organizations are found to routinely exaggerate the benefits and
-------------------------------  discount the costs in planning major initiatives ^ovallo and Kahneman, 2003). When
pessimistic opinions are suppressed and optimistic rewarded, an organization’s 
capacity for critical thinking is seriously undermined. This does not imply that 
optimism is bad, or that managers should try to root it out of themselves or their 
organizations. However, optimism and realism need to be balanced -  between goals 
and forecasts, as suggested by Lovallo and Kahneman (2003).
Complex decision heuristics
Manager’s ability to use complex decision heuristics correctly is another key factor that 
makes it possible to distinguish between intuitive and analytical decision processes. 
Koehler et al. (2002) have shown that much of the biases that can be attributed to 
managers’ overconfidcnce can also be related to the improper use of decision heuristics. 
The reason is that bavSe rate neglect appears to be crucial in both cases. In decision 
research, it is commonly assumed that the use of different decision heuristics is an 
adaptive response of an information processor with limited capacity for information 
processing (Baron, 1994; Payne et al., 1993). Such demands may include how complex 
the problem is and whether or not uncertainty is involved. One reason for using 
decision heurivstics in everyday life is that optimal strategies often are unknown or 
unknowable (Simon, 1987). However, the term heuristics may not only be understood 
as equivalent to rule of thumb. For instance, Baron (1998) argues that the term 
intuitions may, in many cases, be as relevant here since the principles in question are 
not always used as rules of thumb.
Sometimes the use of complex decision heuristics may lead to characteristic errors 
or biases (Kahneman et al., 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Gilovich et al., 2002). It 
has therefore been argued that the focus of the researcher, in this context, must be on 
the features of the complex decision heuristics that may lead to judgmental or 
perceptual biases (Kahneman and Tversky, 1996).
In the present study, we examine how the use of complex decision heuristics 
introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) may influence information systems 
managers’ reasoning with regard to strategic issues in their organizations. Thus, we 
focus on traditional complex decision heuristics such as the availability heuristic, the 
represenativencss heuristic, and the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. It is assumed 
that the impact of these complex decision heuristics on real life decisions wdll result in 
different information processing behaviours, based on the fact that all these complex 
decision heuristics basically reflect peoples’ inability to interpret information in a 
logical and statistically correct way. It has recently been shown that IT managers 
frequently use decision heuristics in a way that results in biases (Fuglseth and 
Gronhaug, 2003). However, we believe that it may be less easy to actually trace the 
usage of complex decision heuristics to the perception and evaluation of IT importance.
PrevioUvS research has revealed that high performers’ decision processes compared 
to low performers’, are less influenced by the framing of information (Selart et a l, 2006). 
High performers search for more information and spend more time on the process. 
However, performance on confidence judgment tasks seems to have a greater impact 
than the execution of the decision heuristic tasks in these respects. Hence the following 
hypothesis can be made:
H I. Overconfidence will have a greater impact than the use of complex decision 
heuristics on the way IT managers perceive and evaluate the importance of 
IT. Overconfidence will kx)m larger than complex decision heuristics as a 
factor when differences due to managerial decision style are detected.
H2. The decision style of an IT manager will be able to predict how he or she 
perceives and evaluates the importance of IT.
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Design
In order to test the stated hypotheses we apply a design in which a cognitive leadership 
test is used assessing two central dimensions of leadership cognition, namely decision 
heuristic usage and confidence judgment ability. In this connection, three different 
decision heuristics are investigated (representativeness, availability and 
anchoring/adjustment). Based on the test, four managerial decision styles are 
devek)ped, built on high versus low performance on each dimension. In addition to the 
test, interviews are held with each manager. These interviews focus on four central 
areas of IT management, namely:
(1) visions regarding IT in the organization;
(2) motives for IT development;
(3) opportunities and obstacles to the development of IT; and
(4) measurement of IT.
We test our hypotheses by relating the four different decision styles to the answer 
patterns tied to the central areas of IT management in the interviews.
Participants
A total of 27 information system managers participated in the study and were recruited 
from organizations with over 130 employees. The mean number of employees was 
4,567 (the size of the organizations varied between 130 and 55,000 employees). The 
majority of the organizations were dealing with manufacturing and service (both 
public and private).
The mean age of participants was 42.8 years (SD =  10.2) within a range of 21 to 60 
years. The managers differed with regard to their background, level of education, and 
their position in the organization. They also differed with regard to the type of 
organization they worked in, how long they had been working with information 
systems, and for how many years they had been working for the organization. Table I 
gives an overview of what type of organization the participants were employed in, their 
position in the organization, as well as their level of education.
MD
46,9 Position Level of education Type of organization
IT manager Tech. College Public sector
IT manager Senior Migh School Manufacturing ind.
IT manager Business Sch(X)l Laboratory company
IT manager Teaching College Public sector
1330 IT manager Business Sch(X)l Manufacturing indIT manager Senior I ligh School Production company
IT manager Tech. College Manufacturing ind
IT president Tech. College Manufacturing ind
Computer manager Tech. College Manufacturing ind
Computer manager Tech. College Manufacturing ind
IT manager Senior High Sch(x>l Manufacturing ind
IT manager Senior High Sch(X)l Manufacturing ind
IT manager Tech. College Service company
IT coordinator Tech. College Manufacturing ind.
IT manager University Manufactoring ind.
IT coordinator Tech. College Public sector
Computer manager Senior High Schcx)l Service company
ADP coordinator Senior High School Manufacturing ind
ADP manager Tech. College Manufacturing ind.
Administrative manager Senior I ligh School Manufacturing ind.
Administrative manager Business &hool Manufacturing ind
Administrative manager College, Social science '^lanufacturi^ g ind
Table I. Administrative manager Business School Manufacturing ind
Managers’ position in the Financial manager College, Social science Car dealer
organization, their level IT manager and group leader College, S(x;ial science Public sector
of education, and type of President Business sch(X)l Transportation comp.
organization belonging I/)cal manager Tech. College Manufacturing ind
In total, 18 participants were in charge of their company’s respective division for 
information systems. Ten participants were also responsible for the economy and the 
administration in addition to being responsible for the information systems, or they 
were responsible for the whole business. Taken together, four participants were 
members of the executive board, 1 1  participants were part of a managerial group, and 
twelve participants had positions below the managerial group level. When looking at 
levels of education, it turned out that 16 participants had some form of higher 
education whereas eleven had some form of high school diploma as their highest 
education.
Materials and procedure
Participants were contacted by telephone and were asked to participate in the 
investigation that consisted of an interview and a second part where they would have 
to make judgments with a relevance to decision theory. They were told that the aim of 
the study was to collect data for a scientific study. The interviews were in most cases 
performed at the participants’ work places and were conducted m a semi-structured 
form. The interview followed the same format with all of the participants. First, 
participants were requested to provide some background data. The interview was then 
conducted and recorded.
A brief questionnaire was distributed to the pari:idpants prior to taking part in 
interviews. The questionnaire contained some general questions about background 
variables, such as age, gender, level of education, and previous employment. 
Additional questions were subsequently asked about how many years participants 
had been working in their profession and in their organization, the type of organization 
they worked in, as well as their position in the organization.
The interview questions mainly concerned visions, current strategies, evaluations 
etc. related to the management of information systems and were based on the results 
obtained from previous research (Allwood and Hedelin, 1996; Hirscheim, 1989; Mayo, 
1991; Weill and Ross, 2004; Van Bon et oL, 2005). The focus has been on IT governance, 
that is, on the accountability frameworks that exist in order to encourage desirable 
behaviour in the use of IT among managers. The questions that we applied were aimed 
at investigating the use and development of information systems in the organizations. 
They were designed such that they would address relevant managerial issues as well 
as providing ecologically valid data from everyday life pertinent to the hypotheses. 
The relevance of the questions to management had been secured in a pilot study. In the 
interview, participants were presented with a set of vsemivstructured questions that are 
presented below:
(1) Visions regarding IT in the organization:
• What kind of visions do you have regarding the use of IT in your 
organi7^tion?
• How will your visions affect the processing of information in the decision 
making process?
• How sure arc you that these visions are the correct ones ?
(2) Motives for IT devebpment
• What are your motives for the IT development?
• What can you gain from IT development in the future?
• How do your motives affect the processing of information in the decision 
making process?
• How sure are you that there are not any other important motives?
(3) Opportunities and obstacles to the development o f  IT:
• What are the opportunities and obstructions for effective use of IT in your 
organization?
• How do the opportunities and obstructions affect the pnx;essing of 
information in your decision making?
(4) Measurement of IT effects:
• How do you evaluate the effects of IT in your company?
• How sure are you that that there are not any other important effects?
Following the interview, participants completed a series of tasks to measure their 
heuristic making style. The heuristic decision making style was assessed by decision 
heuristic tasks as well as confidence tasks (Selart et al., 2006; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974; Pious, 1993). The test booklet consisted of 24 questions. These were divided into
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40  g  they measured. Each category consisted of six questions, and the four decision
' heuristic categories included were representativeness, availabihty, and
anchoring/adjustment. Each question always had a correct answer and a wrong 
answer. After having given an answer, participants were also requested to give a 
confidence rating on a half-ranged scale ranging from 50 (making a guess) to 100 
1332 (absolute sure) to indicate how sure they were that they had given the correct answer.
-------------------------------  The heuristic tasks and the confidence judgment tasks were related to theory in the
sense that they made it possible to create four decisions styles based on high or low 
performance on each of the two types of tasks.
After having completed these tasks, participants were informed about the full 
purpose of the study. A full session including the interview and the decision heuristics 
tasks lasted between one- and one-and-half hours.
Coding oftlie protocols
The data from the interviews were coded into different categories according to content 
and the question asked. This was achieved by the creation of a coding scheme that was 
subject to consensus by several independent coders with regard to the relevance of the 
categories for the hypotheses. In each interview protocol a number of key paragraphs 
were identified as meaningful narratives of the interview. Subsequently, these 
narratives were coded with regard to the established coding scheme and the coding 
subjected to an inter-coder reliability test. Intercoder reliability is a measure of 
agreement among multiple coders for how they apply codes to text data and can be 
used as a proxy for the validity of constructs that emerge from the data. In order to test 
the reliability of the category codings we applied the Cohen’s kappa coefficient which is 
a statistical measure of intercoder reliability. It is generally thought to be a more robust 
measure than simple percent agreement calculation since k  takes into account the 
agreement occurring by chance. Cohen’s kappa measures the agreement between two 
raters who each classify N  items into C mutually exclusive categories. If the raters are 
in complete agreement then k  =  1. If there is no agreement among the raters (other 
than what would be expected by chance) then k <  0. Intercoder reliablity of our 
category codings summoned up to k  =  0.61.
Construction o f  task measure
The heuristic task measure was constructed by summing the the number of times the 
respondents answered correctly across the 24 different heuristic tasks. A correct 
answer was always coded as 1, and an incorrect one as 0. If participants chose the 
correct answer, the corresponding confidence rating was given a positive value, 
otherwise it was given a negative value. An index measure of confidence was obtained 
by taking the mean values of the confidence ratings of the same 24 tasks. All 
participants that performed above the mean value on the choices (M =  10.77, 
SD =  1.77) and on the confidence ratings (M =  77.14, SD =  7.50) were coded as high 
achievers, and those performing below or equal to the mean values were coded as low 
achievers. In this way, it was possible to create four groups of participants; one group 
consisting of high achievers with high accuracy and calibration (logical-statistical and 
balanced confidence), and a second group of low achievers with low accuracy and 
calibration (biased and overconfident). Furthermore a third group was constructed
consisting of those participants that performed below or equal to the mean value on the 
choices but above the mean value of the confidence ratings (biased and balanced 
confidence). Finally, a fourth group consisted of those participants that had performed 
above the mean value on the choices but below the mean value of the confidence 
ratings Qogical-statistical and overconfident).
Results
This section reports the findings from our investigation, focusing on the impact of the 
four managerial decision styles on:
(1) visions regarding IT in the organization;
(2) motives for IT development;
(3) opportunities and obstacles to the development of IT, and
(4) measurement of IT
Decision style impact on managers’ descriptions o f  visions regarding IT  in the 
organization
Chi-square tests were performed on each of the four decision heuristic group. The 
means for all groups with regard to managers’ descriptions of visions regarding IT in 
the organization are presented in Figure 1.
The answers were coded into three categories (see Figure 1). Category 1 (k =  4) 
represents answers where participants expressed an IT vision in which IT was 
developed in a deeper sense that changed the organizarion structure. Category 2 
(« =  17) represents answers where participants expressed an IT vision in which they
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□  LS/BC 
■  B/OC
□  B/BC
□  LS/OC
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3
Key:
LS/BC = Lcjgical-statistical and balanced confident 
B/OC = Biased and overconfident 
B/BC = Biased and balanced confident 
LS/OC = Logical-statistical and overconfident
Notes:
Category 1 = Development of organizational structures and routines 
Category 2 = Innovative resource for company activities 
Category 3 = Substitute technology
Figure 1.
Numbers of managers in 
respective groups and 
distribution of answers 
regarding IT visions
MD
46,9
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viewed IT as an innovative resource for the company’s field of activities. Accounts 
were also presented where managers modernized their own organizations’ routines 
with the help of the new technology. Category 3 (w =  5) represents answers where 
managers expres.sed an IT vision where IT was seen only as a form of substitute 
technology that rationalized and facilitated the systems of production and 
administration in the organization’s own field of activities.
The tests revealed that for the logical-statistical and balanced confidence group no 
significant effect was obtained between the categories, x i  ~  0-00, n.s. A significant 
effect was yielded for the biased and overconfident group, x i  ~  10 .02, p <  0.01, 
indicating that managers in this group produced substantially more answers 
belonging to Category 2 than to Category 1 and 3. For the biased and balanced 
confidence group, no effect appeared, =  2.01, n.s. The test of the logical-statistical 
and overconfident group revealed a clear difference between the categories, indicating 
that managers in this group gave significantly more Category 2 answers, =  15.2.^ 
p <  0.001. A general finding was that most answers from all groups tended to be 
Category 2 answers. This difference was statistically significant, Xi =  12.08, p <  0.01.
Decision style impact on managers’ descriptions o f  motives fo r  IT  development 
Additional chi-square tests performed on each of the four managerial decision styles. 
The means for all groups conccming managers’ descriptions of motives for IT 
development are revealed in Figure 2.
Category \{n — 21) describes the answers where managers thought that external 
factors governed the development of IT within their own organization to a very high 
degree, and where the organization would have to follow this development in order to 
remain in the market. Category 2 (« =  5) describes the answers where managers
Figure 2.
Number of managers in 
rcspwtive groups and 
distribution of answers 
related to motives for the 
development of IT
□  LS/BC 
SB/OC
□  B/BC
□  LS/OC
Category 1 Category 2
Key:
LS/BC = Logical-statistical and balanced confident 
B/OC = Biased and overconfident 
B/BC = Biased and balanced confident 
LS/OC = Logical-statistical and overconfident
Notes:
Category 1 = Client and supplier relations 
Category 2 = Inner efficiency
considered that internal factors governed the development of IT within their own 
organization.
The tests revealed that for the logical-statistical and balanced confidence group and 
for the biased and overconfident group, no significant diffrences were revealed 
between the answer categoricvs, X\ =  2.00, n.s., and x (  =  2.00, n.s., respectively. For 
the biased and balanced confidence group a significant difference was observed, was 
yielded by x\ =  4.00, p <  0.05, indicating that these managers stated reliably more 
Category 1 than Category 2 answers. For the logical-statistical and overconfident 
group a significant difference between the answer categories was also sustained,
=  4.50, p  <  0.05, revealing that also participants in this group gave significantly 
more answers belonging to Category 1 than to Category 2. A chi-square test performed 
on the combined four groups yielded a significant difference between the answer 
categories, as sustained by =  9.85, p <  0.01. This effect again indicated that 
significantly more Category 1 than Category 2 answers were stated.
Decision style impact on managers’ descriptions o f  opportunities and obstacles to the 
development o f  IT
Further additional chi-square tests performed on each of the four decision heuristic 
groups were made. The means for all groups with regard to managers’ descriptions of 
opportunities and obstacles to the development of IT are presented in Figure 3.
Category 1 (« =  15) represents answers where managers expressed that the greatest 
obstacle to development was believed to be inadequate IT rompetence in their own 
organization. Category 2 ( « =  8) represents answers where companies and
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□  LS/BC 
■  B/OC
□  B/BC
□  LS/OC
Category Category Category Category Category 
1 2 3 4 5
Key:
LS/BC = Logical-statistical and balanced confident 
B/OC = Biased and overconfident 
B/BC = Biased and balanced confident 
LS/OC = Logical-statistical and overconfident
Notes:
Category 1 = Inadequate competence 
Category 2 = Centralization 
Category 3 = Costs
Category 4 = Inadequate management 
Category 5 = Infrastructure
Figure 3.
Number of managers in 
respective groups and 
distribution of answers 
related to factors 
obstructing the 
development of IT
MD
46,9
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organizations were considered part of an industrial group where the ownership culture 
was different. Categories 3, 4, and 5 {n =  5, n =  3, and k =  3, respectively) represents 
answers where other factors were mentioned as obstructing IT development including 
general costs, the management’s lack of ability to perceive opportunities for 
technok)gical development, and lack of infrastructures such as developed data 
networks.
The tests revealed that for the logical-statistical and balanced confidence group, no 
significant difference was obtained between the answer categories, x l  =  7.80, n.s. The 
means for all groups are shown in Figure 3. A significant effect was yielded for the 
biased and overconfident group, x l  =  10.86,/) <  0.05, indicating that managers in this 
group to a higher extent produced answers belonging to Category 1 and 2. No 
significant effects were obtained between the answer categories for the biased and 
balanced confidence group, x l  =  3.50, n.s., or for the logical-statistical and 
overconfident group, x j  — 8-21, n.s. A chi-square test performed on the combined 
four groups yielded a significant difference between the answer categories, as 
sustained by x l  — 14.76, p <  0.01. The effect indicated that participants gave reliably 
more Category 1 and Category 2 answers.
Decision style impact on managers’ descriptions o f  how one measures the effects o f  IT  
Further additional chi-square tests performed on each of the four decision heuristic 
groups were made. The means for all groups with regard to managers’ descriptions of 
how one measures the effects of IT are presented in Figure 4.
Managers’ answers were presented according to three categories (see Figure 4). 
Category \{n =  17) represents the majority of managers, who did not value either the 
use of IT or the investments made in it with regard to their own organization.
□  LS/BC 
■  B/OC 
a  B/BC
□  LS/OC
Figure 4.
Numbers of managers in 
respective groups and 
distribution of answers 
related to the evaluation of 
IT effects
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3
Key:
LS/BC = Logical-statistical and balanced confident 
B/OC = Biased and overconfident 
B/BC = Biased and balanced confident 
LS/OC = Logical-statistical and overconfident
Notes:
Category 1 = No evaluation
Category 2 = Evaluation through satisfied users and clients 
Category 3 = Evaluation through projects
Category 2 (w =  7) represents those participants whose evaluations reflected whether 
users and clients were satisfied or whether they complained. In Category 3 {n =  2), 
evaluations were based on whether or not the organization achieved the stated project 
goals. Most managers attached great importance to evaluation, but stated remarkably 
W  means of evaluation. The majority of companies and organizations did not 
evaluate the effects of IT in their organizations.
The following non-significant differences between the answer categories were 
yielded after performing chi-square tests on each of the four decision heuristic groups 
(I.ogical-statistical and balanced confidence, x j  =  4.77, n.s,, Biased and overconfident, 
x l  =  1,00, n,s,, Biased and balanced confidence, x l  ~  n s-)- However for the 
logical-statistical and overconfident group, a significant difference between the answer 
categories was revealed, x\ ~  p <  0,01. A significant effect was also observed 
between the answer categories for the combined four groups, X2 =  12.54, p <  0.01, 
revealing that most answers belonged to Category 1.
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Discussion
It is generally agreed upon that decision makers in organizations should act logical, 
statistical, and with a balanced confidence in their own knowledge in order to achieve 
success. Biased perceptions and overconfidence on the other hand are most often 
associated with failure, in the literature (Baron, 1994, 1998; Kahneman et al, 1982; 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1996).
In the present study, we investigated if confidcnce judgments and complex decision 
heuristics, treated as four distinctive leadership styles (logical-statistical and balanced 
confident, biased and balanced confidence, biased and overconfident, and 
logical-statistical and overconfident) were able to explain managers’ issue 
interpretation wath regard to how they regarded the role of IT in their organization.
Overconfident managers saw information technology more as innovative resources 
for company activities than as a vehicle for the development of organizational 
structures and routines or technology substitution. An emphasis on visions as 
innovative resources rather than as vehicles for promoting efficiency, may suggest that 
these managers were victims of a control illusion. The managers’ control illusion in 
turn may be connected to a higher willingness to invest resources in different types of 
ventures (see also Astebro and Koehler, 2007; Hayward et at., 2006). Unfortunately, 
necessary data for further analysis were not available.
Executives in organizations routinely exaggerated the benefits and discounted the 
costs in planning major initiatives (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003), effectively 
undermining critical thinking in the organizations. Optimism does not necessarily 
undermine effective decision making in organizations but managers need to strike a 
balance between optimism and realism -  between goals and forecasts, as suggested by 
Ivovallo and Kahneman, 2003.
Implications o f  the results
The most “rational” group Oogical statistical and balanced confidence) tended to 
interpret the issues so that no reliable differences could be found between the answer 
categories. This suggests greater flexibility with respect to perspective taking.
For the other styles, reliable differences were sometimes observed among members’ 
different views (see also Allwood and Hedelin, 1996; Hirscheim, 1989; Mayo, 1991;
MD Ward et a l, 1996). Hence, the results of the study suggest that rational managers, as a
¿10 g  i^oup, predominantly engage in different strategic issue interpretations as a way of
’ risk reduction. It is difficult to spot a clear consensus within this group about one
“correct” interpretation when different issues are at stake. Thus, the group seems to 
favour risk aversive rather than risk seeking reasoning.
Furthermore, overconfident and decision biased managers differed from all the 
1338 other groups in their perspective on the factors obstructing the development of IT.
-------------------------------  Overconfident and biased managers saw inadequate competence and centralization as
more important compared to costs, inadequate management, and infrastructure. 
Reliable differences were not observed for the other groups. Managers that performed 
low on both the classical heuristic tasks as well as on the confidence judgment tasks 
pinpointed factors as more important that to a lower degree were linked to their own 
responsibility. Instead, the factors that were addressed as most important appeared to 
have clearer connections to others such as top management and employees at large in 
the organization. It is important to note that inadequacies due to heuristic reasoning as 
well as the overconfidence may contribute to this effect. The general picture is that low 
performance on both tasks contributes to a focus on external rather on internal issues 
and differences in k)cus of amtrol and/or accountability due to this may be assumed 
among the managers (e.g. Selart, 1996, 2005). A possible explanation can be found in 
base rate neglect of own justifiable actions that leads to collective successes and 
failures. Interestingly, the results suggest that intuitive judgments may be more 
diagnostic than rational approaches to decision making in ill-structured judgmental 
tasks (see also, Dane and Pratt, 2007; McMackin and Slovic, 2000).
In sum, the findings suggest that overconfidence plays a larger part in explaining 
inadequate evaluations of IT-systems than biased decision making. Overconfidence 
may compared to biases be more inhibitive on evaluative activity. Lipshitz (1995) 
points out that the uncertainty associated with real-world decisions interrupts ongoing 
action, delays intended action, and guides the development of new alternatives. 
Intuitive reasoning is not by itself more effective than analytical approaches in 
ill-structured tasks (see Dane and Pratt, 2007; McMackin and Slovic, 2000). Rather, 
success is likely to stem from a mixtiire of intuition and analytical capabilities. In such 
a mixture of capabilities, balanced and calibrated confidence judgments seem to be of 
key importance. The realism of these judgments appears to be supported by the use of 
fast and frugal decision heuristics, that is, both analytical and intuitive processes give 
the impression to support calibrated confidence judgments (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). It is 
not established that the interplay between analytical and intuitive capabilities has the 
same successful impact on the use of complex decision heuristics.
Limitations
The number of managers interviewed for the study was relatively small due to 
practical reasons. The industrial sites were geographically spread over a mid-sized 
county area and had to be reached by car. Hence, each interview required a couple of 
hours for the realization and recording alone. Transcription and coding of each 
interview protocol would add an additional two hours. Neither did the study include 
measures on managerial performance that is to what extent overconfident or biased 
managers, differed from the others, in terms of efficiency and performance.
Future research
In the paper we looked at how overconfidencc and complex decision heuristics 
influence managers evaluation of information technology. New research suggests that 
a meaningful distinction can be made between complex and simple decision heuristics 
(Gigerenzer et a l, 1999). Simple decision heuristics are fast and frugal and often 
outperform more formal, statistically informed reasoning. Simple heuristics perform 
well and produce accurate forecasts in difficult, real life situations (Astebro and 
Elhcdhli, 2006). While simple heuristics have been studied in a series of different 
contexts, few studies have looked at the effects of simple heuristics on how managers 
evaluate information technology. This, we suggest represent a promising direction for 
future research.
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